Petroyuan: Difference between revisions
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imported>Doug Williamson (Recreate page to correct date in source. Source: The Treasurer, April 2017, p39.) |
imported>Doug Williamson (Classify page.) |
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:Beijing hopes that the rise of the petroyuan will provide a stable anchor to the value of the renminbi, thereby establishing the renminbi as a global reserve currency. | :Beijing hopes that the rise of the petroyuan will provide a stable anchor to the value of the renminbi, thereby establishing the renminbi as a global reserve currency. | ||
:China | :China had already been paying part of its purchase of Iranian oil in renminbi as early as 2012, as Iran sought to get around Western financial sanctions." | ||
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* [[Reserve currency]] | * [[Reserve currency]] | ||
* [[Yuan renminbi]] | * [[Yuan renminbi]] | ||
[[Category:The_business_context]] |
Latest revision as of 18:48, 29 June 2022
Revenue from the sale of oil, denominated in yuan renminbi.
Crude to China, yuan to Iran
- "Being the world's largest trading nation and net importer of crude oil, China would also naturally desire to make at least part of its oil payments in renminbi.
- Beijing hopes that the rise of the petroyuan will provide a stable anchor to the value of the renminbi, thereby establishing the renminbi as a global reserve currency.
- China had already been paying part of its purchase of Iranian oil in renminbi as early as 2012, as Iran sought to get around Western financial sanctions."
- The Treasurer magazine, April 2017, p39 - Florence Eid-Oakden, chief economist at Arabia Monitor.