Agency problem: Difference between revisions
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== See also == | == See also == | ||
* [[Accountability]] | |||
* [[Agency]] | |||
* [[Agency costs]] | * [[Agency costs]] | ||
* [[Agency theory]] | * [[Agency theory]] | ||
* [[Agent]] | |||
* [[Asymmetry of information]] | * [[Asymmetry of information]] | ||
* [[Complex problem]] | |||
* [[Corporate governance]] | |||
* [[Goal congruence]] | * [[Goal congruence]] | ||
* [[Shareholder value]] | |||
[[Category:Corporate_finance]] | [[Category:Corporate_finance]] | ||
[[Category:Manage_risks]] | [[Category:Manage_risks]] | ||
Latest revision as of 19:16, 19 March 2023
Value management.
The agency problem refers to the problems which arise when management of an organisation is separated from its ownership.
The main potential problem is that the managers (agents) may not act in the best interests of the owners (for example shareholders).
When managers do not act in the owners' best interests, agency costs will arise.
